International technology transfer : a survey of recipient firm experiences in Brazil by Fung, Shing K.


WORKING PAPER
ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A SURVEY OF
RECIPIENT FIRM EXPERIENCES IN BRAZIL
Shing K. Fung
990-78 May 1978
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A SURVEY OF
RECIPIENT FIRM EXPERIENCES IN BRAZIL
Shing K. Fung
990-78 May 1978

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Center for
Policy Alternatives of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
Fundacao Carlos Alberto Vanzolinl of the University of Sao Paulo that made
possible the field research in Brazil for this study. The author is indebted
to the ideas and assistance of many people at both institutions. Special
mention must be made of Professor Richard D. Robinson of the Sloan School of
Management in guiding the research and the pretesting of the questionnaire
during two weeks visit to Sao Paulo, Brazil, and of Jose E. Cassiolato who
assisted the author in many ways throughout his stay in Brazil. Naturally,
any shortcomings in the study are entirely the author's responsibility.
Shing K. Fung
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
May 1978.
n 550^<:^

TABLE OF CONTENT
CHAPTER 1. THE PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
PAGE
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 .2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 2
1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 2
CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
2.1 POLICIES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT k
2.2 POLICIES FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 5
2.3 CONTROL MECHANISM FOR ENTRY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT CAPITAL 8
2.^ CONTROL MECHANISM FOR ENTRY OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 9
CHAPTER 3. THE TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS, THE SURVEY SAMPLE, AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS PROCESSED BY INPI 13
3.2 THE SURVEY SAMPLE 20
3.3 THE QUESTIONNAIRE 22
CHAPTER h. BEHAVIOR OF THE RECIPIENT FIRM IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
^.1 INTERNAL R 6 D AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES 23
k.Z RECEIVING TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT PAYMENTS 26
^4.3 CASES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 27
i^A SEARCH, EVALUATION AND DECISION PROCESS 33
k.5 TRANSFER PROCESS 43
k.G EXPERIENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 52
CHAPTER 5. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 60
REFERENCES 68
APPENDICES 69

Chapter 1. The Purpose and Organization of the Study
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Purpose of the study
1.3 Organization of the study

Chapter 1. The Purpose and Organization of the Study
1. 1 Introduction
Codes of conduct for regulating the International transfer of technology
have become fashionable among developing countries in the 1970' s at the national
level (e.g. in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) as well as the regional level (the
Andean Pact, or the Cartagena Agreement). Multilateral forms of such regulations
are also currently under active debate as part of the 'North-South dialogue' and
in several international organizations, among them the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) , the United Nations Commission on Transnational
Corporations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , and the World Industrial Property
Organization (WIPO)
.
Generally speaking, these codes are aimed at improving the terms under which
developing countries are getting their technologies from abroad by reducing the
costs, unbundling technology packages, and eliminating restrictive conditions
that hinder diffusion, production or distribution. When viewed in a larger con-
text, and indeed sometimes self-proclaimed, these codes represent an important
part of the efforts by developing countries to farther their technological and
economic developments, and to strengthen their control over the behavior of
multinational corporations (MNC's) entering or operating within their boundaries.
While debates are still going on in various international fora concerning
the substance and desirability of such regulations over technology transfer (see S.
Holland 1976, for example), the actual results of their application in some
developing countries are not yet well documented. Most of the recent literature
on the subject of international technology transfer to developing countries are
theoretical discussions from various analytical perspectives. Some view the
problem as essentially one of political economy (e.g. C. Cooper 1973, 0. Sunkel
1971); or one of economics (e.g. A. Sen 1968, F. Stewart 1972); or one of bar-
gaining between MNC's and developing countries (e.g. C. Vaitsos 1971, P. Streeten
1973, and R. Vernon 1971). Perhaps stemming largely from the recentness of the
imi)lementation of these codes of regulation (mostly in the early or mid 70' s) and
inherent difficulties in obtaining empirical data, there are few studies based on
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analyses of actual behavior of firms operating under these codes and the charac-
teristics of the technology transfer agreements so processed (one such study is
R. Robinson 1976).
As a result, there are many unanswered questions concerning how these codes
are administered by the host governments, whether their implementations are
successful, and what might account for their success or failure.
1.
2
Purpose of the study
This study is an attempt to fill part of this gap by using Brazil as a case
study to evaluate the impact of host government control on commercial transactions
of technology transfer. Underlying the study are two basic and related hypotheses:
a. There are substantial gaps between stated objectives and the implementa-
tion of the control system (i.e. the regulations are not very effective
in controlling technology transfer as intended).
b. The control system is less effective in dealing with local subsidiaries
of foreign firms than with Brazilian-controlled local firms.
This empirical investigation will therefore address the following questions:
What are the rules and regulations of Brazil's "code of conduct" for
technology transfer?
How do the rules differ according to the ownership of the regulated firm,
i.e. at whom are the regulations directed?
Who is responsible for implementing and enforcing them, and how?
What, in fact, has been the implementation experience?
How do local recipient firms (foreign-controlled versus Brazilian-con-
trolled) behave under the control system?
It is hoped that this study will contribute to better understanding and,
perhaps, improved design of control systems for international technology transfer
to developing countries.
1.
3
Organization of the study
The rest of this paper will be organized into four chapters. Chapter two
will describe the Brazilian control system for technology transfer — the policies.

the regulations, and administering mechanisms.
Chapter three will highlight characteristics of the technology agreements
processed under the system. This data base was compiled by the author and repre-
sents all the technology agreements processed by the controlling agency since
its inception till July 1975, when it stopped publishing details concerning
individual agreements for unknown reasons. A comprehensive analysis of the 4500
or so technology agreements in this data base will be part of a forthcoming
doctoral thesis by the author and will not be included here. Instead, a brief
commentary and several tables of statistics will be presented to illustrate
the stratified population from which the survey sample was drawn. Later on in
Chapter five, references will be made to these technology agreements to help
support or qualify some of the generalizations based on observations from the
sample survey. The rest of Chapter three will discuss the sampling procedure,
the questionnaire, and the interviews.
Chapter four will highlight the results from the sample survey of forty-
nine recipient firms in Brazil (25 locally-controlled and 24 foreign-controlled)
concerning their technology transfer activities and their experience with the
government control system. Individual sections will be devoted to local technical
activities of the firms (both in-house and from other local sources) ; cases of
technology transfer from abroad; pre-registration search and evaluation activities
for technology suppliers; the process of registering the technology transfer
agreements with the controlling agency; and post-registration experiences with
the control system. Comparisions between locally-controlled and foreign-controlled
firms in the sample will be made throughout.
Chapter five will then examine the two hypotheses stated earlier in the light
of major conclusions from the survey. That is, an assessment will be made as to
whether the implementation of the control system has been effective relative to
its stated goals, and how the relative effectiveness of control vary with the
ownership control of the recipient firm.

Chapter 2. Characteristics of the Government Control System
2.1 Policies for foreign direct investment
2.2 Policies for foreign technology transfer
2.3 Control mechanism for entry of foreign investment capital
2.4 Control mechanism for entry of foreign technology
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Chapter 2. Characteristics of the Government Cbhtrol System
Since foreign direct Investment and contractual agreements are sub-
stltutory and often complementary channels for the International transfer
of technology, a description of the control system for technology transfer
must Include both,
2,1 Policies For Foreign Direct Investment
Brazil has one of the most open and favorable policies towards foreign
Investments among developing countries. Brazil Is a traditional receiver
of foreign Investments and there are no official restrictions on Its Inflow
except that exploration, extraction and refining of petroleum, domestic
airlines, communications, publishing and coastal shipping are restricted to
loot Brazilian-owned enterprises, while partial foreign participation Is
permitted In mining, fishing, hydroelectric power, banking and Insurance*
The only requirement for foreign Investment Is that It must be registered
with FIRCE (Department of Supervision and Registration of Foreign Capital)
of the Central Bank, Profit remittance abroad Is limited to ]2% {]6% when
not counting 25% withholding tax on the remittance) of registered Invest-
ment. Beyond that limit, a supplementary Income tax up to S0% will be lev-
led on the remittance. There are no discriminatory treatments between for-
eign and national firms except that royalty payments are not permitted be-
tween a foreign subsidiary (defined legally as 501 or more of whose voting
equity Is owned directly or Indirectly by a foreign entity) and Its parent
company and technical assistance fees between such parties are taxed at 30%,
the same rate as profit remittances. Furthermore, a foreign subsidiary
cannot obtain long-term local financing from government sources and govern-
ment guarantees against International loans, unless the investment Is con-
sidered by CDI (Industrial Development Council) of the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce as high priority for the national economy. This last handicap
can be significant as fiscal Incentives granted by CDI can lower the cost
of fixed assets by 50%.
implicit within this open policy towards foreign investments are per-
haps three major goals. First of all, Brazil needs the substantial Inflow

5 -
of foreign investments to finance its industrial development and to maintain
a high rate of GNP growth. Substantial direct investments are also made by
the government to offset insufficient capital formation from local private
sources and to counter-balanca the foreign presence. Secondly, Brazil needs
the foreign technology that accompanies the flow of foreign direct Investment.
Thirdly, the flow of direct investment capital, in addition to huge inflows of
official loan capital, is perhaps needed to help finance Brazil's large balance
of payments deficit in the current account, especially in the last few years.
However, there are recent indications that Brazil is seeking to have
tighter control over foreign investments, despite continued encouragement of
its inflow. Official guidelines for foreign direct investment are given in the
second National Development Plan IdTS'JS* which states that "tt becomes
ever more Important to define clearly how foreign enterprises should be
situated wtthin national development strategy, and to have at hand Instru-
ments to Implement the orientation dectded upon." The government expects
foreign Investment to:
. Develop new export markets not traditionally serviced by Brazil;
. Contribute further to technological development by performing R&D
locally and buying local machinery and equipment;
, Refrain from controlling the market, either by restraint of trade
or buying out local competitors; and
. Transfer technology and develop local management capacity.
On the other hand, the plan states that the government wtlt attempt
to diversify the sources of foreign Investment and use Incentives and
disincentives rather than restrictive legislation to achieve Its objec-
tives.
t
2.2 Policies For Foreign Technology Transfer
The policies towards foreign technology transfer were recently stated
In the first Basic Plan for Scientific and Technological Development (PBDCT
1973/7'*). As a general approach, the transfer of technology from abroad Is
to be speeded up and oriented properly alongside with efforts to strengthen
the capacity for Internal technological Innovation. The policy for techno-
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logy transfer Ts to be based on:
• Definition of prtortty sectors according to product/process nature,
significance for national development and possibilities of domestic
solution of technological problems;
. Reduction of costs of Importing technology to reduce the exchange
deficit In the technological balance of payments;
• Improvement of knowledge of the world supply of technology to
strengthen the bargaining position of Brazilian enterprises;
. Flexible application of the world patent system; and
. Removal of barriers to local absorption and dissemination of Im-
ported technology through elimination of contractual restrictions
In technology transfer agreements.
In 1971, INPl (the National Institute of Industrial Property) was
established under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to replace the old
patent office. INPI's main functions are to administer the norms and legis-
lations regulating trademarks, patents, and technology transfer agreements.
With respect to regulating the registration of technology transfer agree-
ments, which Include licensing agreements for patents and trademarks as well
as technical assistance agreements, INPl •stabllshed the following guide-
lines:^
• To favor Importation of technology over Importation of capital or
goods;
. To acquire technology Instead of ranting It;
. To eliminate contractual or Implicit restrictions for local absorp-
tion and dissemination;
, To evaluate the technology to be Imported;
• To strengthen the bargaining position of the national licensee;
• To reduce the costs of tha tachnology to ba Imported;
l\ Quoted by Peter Dirk Slemsen, Ltcenslng of Industrial Property and
Transfer of Technology In Brazil. Rio de Janeiro, \°nh.
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.
To support the technologTcal development of the nattonal enterprise;
.
To Increase exports, particularly of Fndustrtal products, avoiding
market llmttatlons through trademark licensing;
, To develop knowledge of available technological alternatives;
, To favor non-percentage payments for technical assistance, and
when admftted, llmfttng the percentages;
.
To avotd secrecy clauses or prohibition to continue production after
termtnatTon whereby know-how agreements become patents for unlimited
terms; and
• To maintain the present nattonal Interest by not discouraging the
Inflow of foreign tnvestment and the real transfer of technology*
In September 1975, INPI announced its Normative Act No. 15, under which
technology agreements are classified into five new categories:
• License agreements for patents;
• License agreements for trademarks;
. Agreements for the supply of Industrial technology (Intended for
production of consumer goods or materials In general);
. Agreements for techn Teal -Industrial cooperation (manufacture of
capital goods); and
• Specialized techn^cal services agreements.
The contractual duration for Hcenses was changed from the former maxi-
mum of five years to not to exceed the period of validity of the protection
granted to Industrial property as follows:
, Fifteen years for patent of Invention; and
. Ten years for patent of utility model. Industrial model or design.
The contractual duratton for the supply of Industrial technology and
technical-Industrial cooperation was to be determined by the time necessary
to enable the recipient to master the technology, whereas that for special-
ized technical services was to be the time needed for the rendering of ser-
vices or the completion of the project.
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Another major change under the Act is that the payment of income and
withholding taxes will be determined by the two parties concerned in the
contractual arrangement. Previously, INPI did not permit the burden of tax
payments to be carried by the licensee.
2.3 Control Mechanism for the Entry of Foreign Investment
The control of the Inflow of foretgn capital Is exerc sed through the
registration of Investments, reinvestments and remittances at the Central
Bank, and through the granting of fiscal Incentives by the Industrial De-
velopment Council (CDl of the Ministry of Industry and Comrierce) to channel
Investments Into priority Industrial sectors.
The fundamental law governing foreign capital Is Law ^131 of September
1962, as amended by Law '»930 of August 1964. This law Is closely related
to foreign exchange control In that the foreign exchange needed for remitting
profits and technology payments are made available only If the Investments
and reinvestments have been previously registered at the Central Bank. Reg-
istration Is required for:
. Foreign capital which enters Brazil In the form of direct Invest-
ments or loan, whether In money or In physical assets (machinery
and equipment];
, Reinvestment of earnings of foretgn capital;
• Remittances abroad of dividends. Interest, amortization of loan,
repatriation of capital and payments of royalties and fees for
technical assistance; and
. Alterations In the nominal value of foreign capital according to the
Inflatton Index established under monetary correction legislation.
It should be noted that registration requirements are only administra-
tive procedures with no evaluation Involved In that the entry of foreign
capital does not require government approval.

The Inflow of foreign cjipHal can Be tndtrectly Influenced by the
fiscal Incentives offered by CD I to belp stimulate and channel Investments
Into Industrial sectors considered as high-prforlty by the government. If
a foreign Investment project seeks and obtains CDI approval for Incentives,
It may enjoy a series of benefits:
, Exemption of duties and excise taxes for Imported machinery,
equipment, parts and components;
. Local financing from government sources and/or government guaran-
tees against International loans;
.
Accelerated depreciation of fixed assets acquired In Brazil; and
, Priority study by the Customs Policy Council (CPA - Conselho de
Polftica Aduaneira) for the advisability of tariff protection a-
galnst competition from Imports.
As mentioned before, the fiscal Incentives given by CDI can reduce the
cost of fixed asMtt ky almott SOI and hence can lead to substantial compe-
titive edges.
2. k Control Mechanism for the Entry of Foreign Technology
The entry of foreign capital is relatively free from government inter-
vention when compared with the entry of foreign technology. The import of
foreign technology embodied in machinery and equipment is directly controlled
by the Department of External Commerce (CACEX - Cartel ra de Comercio Exterior)
of the Bank of Brazil, and, if duty and tax exemptions were sought, indirectly
influenced by CDI (see above). Under Brazilian Decree Law 37 of November 1966,
capital equipment similar to that manufactured locally cannot be imported
duty-free. CACEX is the agency that rules on the existence of 'similars'
according to the criteria of price, performance and delivery time.
On the other hand, the transfer of technology through technical assistance
agreements and licenses for patents and trademarks are regulated by INPI
through the registration of the agreements, and by the Central Bank through
the authorization of payment remittences. A firm in Brazil that enters into
such agreements with a foreign firm must go through the following steps:
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, Under the Industrfal Property Code of 1971, such technology agree-
ments must be approved and registered with INPI, together with
documentation Justifying the acquisition of technology from out-
side the country, advantages for the contractee and the national
economy, Mttrnt^d tfnw for absorption w^ tfescrfptlon of the tech-
nology
. When poyiMfit* abrood ara tnvolvad, upon registration with INPt,
the agreement must also be registered with FIRCE of the Central
Bank. Brazilian law requires the prior registration of the source
of Income, which In this case Is the agreement, whenever remittance
of Income to the exterior Is expected.
.
At the time when actual remittances are made, these certificates
and the Invoices showing services rendered are then presented to
a commercial bank for tha purcKasa of foreign axchanga for the
remittance.
It should be noted that ft is the recipient firm that has to file the
registration, and registration is required whether the technology supplier
Is domiciled abroad or in Brazil. When technical services are urgently needed
and when the payments are less than US$20,000 (US$10, 000 before Normative Act
No. 15), In lieu of a formal contract the recipient firm can submit an invoice
to be approved by INPI.
The registration of technology agreements with INPI Is potentially
enforced on the recipient firm through three mechanisms:
. Without the registration, the recipient firm will not be able to remit
payments to the foreign technology supplier.
. Without the registration, the recipient firm is not [permitted to deduct
such payments as expenses against its taxable income (except when the
payment Is from a foreign-controlled subsidiary to Its parent, In which
case the payment is not tax deductible).
. Patents and trademarks registered in Brazil are subject to forfeiture or
compulsory licensing to third parties when not worked for a certain period
of time. Registration of patent or trademark licenses is therefore necessary
to prove working.
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In evaluating the technology agreements, INPI approves a maximum scale
of payment based on the tax-deduct Ibll I ty ceilings for technology payments
established by the Ministry of Finance under Directive ^36 of December 1958,
which, incidentally, has not been revised since. In the case of trademark
agreements, the payment ceiling allowed is ]% of sales value net of the val-
ue-added taxes (IPI, ICM) and the costs of Imported components and ipaterfals.
For patent and technical assistance agreements, the payment ceilings range
from ]% to S% of net sales value (net of taxes and Imported Input) of the
product referred to In the agreement. The payment scales for different
sectors are presented in Appendix 2.
1
In the case of lump-sum or fixed non-percentage payments, INPI normally
requests an estimate for the first five years and accepts a total not higher
than which the maximum percentage would generate. No minimum royalties are
accepted, but It Is possible to Include minimum production or sales figures
upon which royalties will be based. Fees paid for technicians usually may
not exceed US $200 per person per day. Finally, all payments made to the
exterior are subject to a withholding tax of 25%.
Prior to the establishment of Normative Act No. 15, INPI would only
approve an agreement for a maximum of five years, which may then be renewed
for another maximum of five years If justified by the applicant, but usually
at a lower rate of payment. These are the same as the duration limits of
tax-deduct I bi
1
ity of technology expenses accepted by the Ministry of Finance.
When a Brazilian firm is foreign-controlled in that 50^ or more of
Its voting equity Is held by the supplier directly or indirectly through a
third company, no royalty payments for patents and trademarks are permitted
between the two parties. Furthermore, technical assistance payments between
the two, while permitted, are not deductible for tax purposes and hence
taxed at the profit remittance rate of 30%, plus 5% distributed profit tax
If the subsidiary Is not an open capital company. However, It Is known
that some foreign firms bypass the restriction of receiving payments for
patents and trademarks from their subsldlartes by capitalizing know-how as
Investment. Since Law k]"}} does not permit registering knowhow as foreign
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Investment, a technique fs used whereby the subsidiary places an order with
the parent company which in a parallel transaction registers an equivalent
amount as cash Investment In the local firm. Neither goods nor money actu-
ally change hands, but the foreign firm receives payment for its l<now-how in
the form of profits on Its theoretical Investment. Apparently such schemes
are tcnown and accepted by the Central Banlc.
tn the case of patents and trademartcs, no payments are permitted If
they were not granted In Brazil, have expired, been annulled or cancelled,
or granted to a foreign entity on an application ffled without claiming a
foreign priority.
INPI will not approve technology agreements tfwt contain restrtcttons
on the production, marlceting or export of the products, or the huport of
intermediate Inputs necessary for their manufacture, or requiring the li-
censee to use only the trademark of the licensor. Exceptions for export
restrictions may be allowed for areas where the licensor has exclusive li-
cense agreements for Industrial property. Improvements made In the licensed
product by the licensee remain Its property. INPI will also not accept
confidentiality clauses beyond the term of the agreement or price control by
the licensor over the sales price of the licensed product. Finally, sub-
licensing by the licensee Is permitted.

Chapter 3- The Technology Agreements, the Survey Sample, and the Questionnaire
3.1 Characteristics of the Technology Agreements Processed by INRI
3.2 The Survey Sample
3.3 The Questionnaire
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Chapter 3. The Technology Agreements, the Survey Sample, and the Questionnaire
3. 1 Characteristics of the Technology Agreements Processed by INPI
The survey sample for this study was drawn from the population of firms in
Brazil that had submitted technology transfer agreements to INPI for registration.
Using information from various sources (see appendix 3.1), a data base was com-
piled for all the technology agreements processed by INPI from 1972 to June 1975
(us of July 1975 INPI discontinued publishing most of i he basic information about
the agreements). The data base contains information on the ownership and industrial
sector of the recipient firm; its relationship with the technology supplier: the
type and duration of the agreement; and the terms of payment.
While the remainder of this section will present some highlights of these
characteristics, most evaluative comments will be reserved for Chapter five in
conjunction with observations from the interview survey of the sample firms.
From 1972 to June 1975> INPI has processed a total of 6I85 technology
agreements, the dispositions of which are sunmartzed In Table 3-
I
•
TABLE 3.1 DISPOSITION OF TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS
CATEGORY
OF ACTION 1972 1973 197'« 1975 (To June) TOTAL
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the announcement of Normative Act No. 15) in September 1975. Another possible
explanation is that it was part of the government's effort to discourage the
short-term outflow of foreign exchange in view of the balance of payments crisis.
While the number of agreements approved increased at rates of 13-^% and
17.0% in 1973 and 197^4, the payment approved increased by 27.6% and 33.2%, almost
twice as fast. When the payments are normalized by the number of agreements, the
average payment per agreement for the four years are, in thousands of U.S. dollars,
2*41, 269, 306 and 478. Everything else being equal, this would seem to imply a
steady rise in the price of technology. However, further analysis reveals that
much of the increase in the total payment can be attributed to different sectors
in different years (see Table 3-'*). These sectors are petroleum and chemicals in
1973; petroleum, chemicals, metallurgy, and paper and pulp in 197'»; and energy
(government) and transportation materials (automobiles) in 1975. This is an in-
teresting fact, for a closer examination of the data base shows that the recipient
firms that accounted for these huge increases in technology payments are mostly
state enterprises, local subsidiaries of MNC's, or joint ventures of these two.
Distinctively absent from this group are private Brazilian-controlled firms.
Another analysis confirms that state-controlled enterprises (including joint
ventures with MNC's) and foreign-controlled enterprises (when the transfer is
from parent to subsidiary, i.e. the 'foreign related' category) accounted for
disproportionate shares of technology payments approved by INPI (see average pay-
ment per agreement, last row in Table 3-5). This imbalance is even more dramatic
for 'technical assistance' payments made by foreign-controlled firms (see row 1,
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3-5), where the average payment per agreement between
related parties are almost twenty times that of unrelated, and presumably arms-
length, transactions. Several important inferences may be drawn.
First, as a group, Brazilian-controlled private firms hardly seem to be the
major culprit in Brazil's substantial payments for foreign technology, if indeed
one of the objectives of the control system is to reduce such payments, it is
doubtful if these firms would serve as effective targets. Second, state enterprises
appear to be the biggest purchasers of foreign technology. Many of them are very
powerful rtxjnopolies or quasi-monopol ies run by the state, and represent some of
the largest companies in Brazil. This raises the question as to how much control
INPI can really exercise over transactions originating from these companies,
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TABLE 3.5
DISTRIBUTION OF APPROVED PAYMENTS BY OWNERSHIP
BY TYPE OF AGREEMENT
TYPE OF AGREEMENT
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Third, the same question may be raised about the MNC subsidiaries, especially
INPI's control over transfer pricing practices in their technical assistance
payments. Lastly, the pattern of technology transfer transactions seems to follow
broadly the recent trend in Brazil's industrial structure, i.e. the rapid growth
of state-controlled and foreign-controlled shares of the industrial economy, es-
pecially in petroleum, petrochemicals, chemicals, metal processing and automobiles.
Given what was mentioned above, an important question is what role INPI really
plays in the overall process of industrial structuring. More will be said about
these points in Chapter five.
3. 2 The Survey Sample
The sample of firms for the survey was chosen from the data base in three
sectors: mechanical equipment, metallurgy and chemicals. The choice of these
sectors was based on both objective and subjective criteria as follows:
. The significance of the sector as a technology importer based on the
number of agreements and payments approved in the data base;
. The feasibility of providing a sufficiently large number of firms in
the Greater Sao Paulo area to safeguard an acceptable number of success-
ful interviews; and
. The overlap with the sectors chosen by other studies in the Center for
Policy Alternatives research program in Sao Paulo (of which this study
was a part) .
After the sectors were chosen, a list of firms in these sectors with head-
quarters in the Greater Sao Paulo area was developed from the data base of
technology agreements. Attempts were made to contact these firms for interviews
with senior officials knowledgeable with the technology transfer transactions.
Successful interviews (at least two-thirds of the questionnaire completed) were
then included in the final sample for analysis. Table 3.6 shows the coverage of
the final sample relative to the population in the three sectors.
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TABLE 3.6 SAMPLE OF FIRMS FOR THE SURVEY WITH TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS
APPROVED BY
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3. 3 The Questionnaire
The interviews with the sample of firms were conducted using a structured
questionnaire consisting of three main parts. The first part deals with the
demographic characteristics and local technical activities of the firm. The
second part deals with the manager's perception and experience with INPI and
the Central Bank. The last part deals with a specific case of technology trans-
fer with respect to the search, selection and implementation processes. A copy
of the questionnaire is attached as appendix 3.2.
The initial questionnaire was pretested for both the ease of administering
and coding during four interviews and was slightly revised, Each firm included
in the final sample for analysis generally required more than one visit, Most
of the executives interviewed were either chief operating officers or division
managers. Most interviews were completed with two or more executives from the
technical, legal or production area to cross-check some responses, There were
twenty-five Brazilian-controlled and twenty-four foreign-controlled firms in
the completed sample.
A comment worthy of note is that state-controlled enterprises were generally
more reluctant to grant interviews than the others. When they permitted interviews
they were generally less forthcoming and informative. Thus the three state-
controlled enterprises among the twenty-five Brazilian-controlled firms under-
represent their significance in terms of the aggregate population. This will
be brought up again in Chapter five.

Chapter 4. Behavior of the Recipient Firm in Technology Transfer
4.1 Internal R&D and Training Activities of the Recipient Firm
4.2 Receiving Technology Without Payments
4.3 Cases of Technology Transfer
4.4 Search, Evaluation and Decision Process
4.5 Transfer Process
4.6 Experience With the Government Control System
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Chapter 4. Behavior of the Recipient Firm in Technology Transfer
The following sections highlight the recipient firm's behavior or percep-
tion at various stages of the transfer process and their interactions with the
control system, with comparisons between foreign-controlled and Brazilian-con-
trolled firms.
4.1 Internal R&D and Trafntng ActfvttfeS of the Rectpfent Firms
4.1.1 Internal RsD Activities
When questioned about their Internal resources (equipment and personnel)
devoted to In-house research and development activities, the firms responded
as follows:
TABLE 4.1 INTERNAL RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
TYPE OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Product or Process Improvement 9 ^ 13
Testing & quality control only 12 12 2k
None 2 6 8
TOTAL RESPONDED 23 22 US
Thirteen firms, or less than 29? of those that responded, reported
having some research activities related to product or process Improvement,
Of these 13, 9 are foreign and k Brazilian. Of the 8 that had no technical
research activities, 6 are Brazilian. While 3^ of the 45 firms reported
having testing and quality control activities within the firm, 2k of them
had nothing beyond that. It would thus appear that the level of research
activities is generally low, especially among the Brazilian firms. Neither
does it seem that the lack of in-house research activities was replaced by
other local Brazilian sources. The firms reported the use of technical assis-
tance from Brazilian sources as follows:
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TABLE 4.2 TECHNrCAL ASSrSTANCE FROM LOCAL SOURCES
TYPE OF ASSISTANCE FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Product or process research
Equipment or matertal testing
None
I
3
19
2
5
15
3
8
3*
TOTAL RESPONDED 23 22 kS
Only 11 out of kSt or 1U% of the firms reported having used technical
assistance from Brazilian sources. Of these 11 cases of local technical assis-
tance, 6 came from Brazilian research rnstttutes, 3 from local firms and 2
from universities. Eight of the cases were for equipment or material testing
and only 3 cases were related to product or process development.
4.1.2 Formal Training Programs
Formal training programs as defined here exclude any Incidental on-the-
job type of training, and represent a recurring activity of the firm. The
types of training were divided Into management (Including sales training),
high-level technical (technical and engineering personnel), and low-level
technical (production personnel),
TABLE 4.3 FORMAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES
TYPE OF TRAINING FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
All three
High-level tech, t mgmt.
High and low-level tech.
High-level tech. only
Low- level tech. only
Management only
None
k
3
3
k
1
1
7
1
3
k
3
11
k
6
8
k
1
18
TOTAL RESPONDED 23 22 US
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Of the ^5 firms that responded, 39* 07 ftrms) had no formal training,
20i (9 firms) had management training, 50* (22 firms) had high-level tech-
nical training, and 32* (l^J flrmsl had low-level technical training. It
appears also that Brazilian firms are behind foreign subsidiaries In their
training activities. Fourteen out of the 22 firms that had some high-level
technical training arc foreign while 11 out of the 18 that had no formal
training programs are Brazilian,
Some of the training activities, especTally those of high-level tech-
nical In nature, took place outside of Brazil under the firm's parent com-
pany or technology supplier.
TABLE 4.4 OVERSEAS TRAINING PROGRAMS
OVERSEAS TRAINING FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Management 6-6
High-level technical 12 7 19
Low-level technical 1 - T .
If the combination of internal R&D and training activities were used as
an Indicator of the firm's Internal technical capacity, the following emerges:
TABLE 4.5 INTERNAL TECHNICAL CAPACITY
TRAINING ACTIVITY PRODUCT/PROCESS TESTING AND NO RESEARCH
RESEARCH QUALITY CONTROL ACTIVITIES
High-level technical & others 5 7 2
High-level technical only 3 ^ 1
Others - 4 1
None 5 9 **
If the firms that have both high-level technical training and some re-
search related to product or process were classified as having good Internal
technical capacity, only 8 firms would qualify as such (7 foreign, 1 Brazi-
lian), leaving 37 (82* of the ^5 firms) as having Inadequate or poor capacity.
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Even If those with high-level technical training and testing or quality con-
trol activities were Included as adequate, 19 firms (12 foreign, 7 Brazilian)
would qualify, and 26 (58% of kS] firms would be considered as having poor
Internal technical capacity,
^2 Receiving Technology without Payments
Nineteen of the k] ftrms that responded reported having received foreign
technology In the last three years without any payments Involved, Thirteen
were foreign firms.
TABLE ^ . 6 FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT PAYMENTS
TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT PAYMENTS FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Received 13 6 19
Did not receive 5 17 22
TOTAL RESPONDED 18 23 k]
Among the technologies received were applications and formulae related
to raw materials, technologies for plant Installation, and servicing of equip-
ment. Eleven of the cases were In the mechanical equipment sector, 7 In the
chemical sector and only 1 In the metallurgical sector.
The reason cited by almost all the foreign firms (12 out of 13) for
receiving the technology free was that the supplier was the parent company.
Five of them also cited legal restrlctTons and difficulty of obtaining INPI
approval for payment. In the case of Brazil tan firms, the most common reason
for free technology was previous relationship with the supplier. Including
one case where the supplier has equity participation In the firm. Only 3
firms reported the technology as freely available from the public domain or
International associations.
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TABLE ^.7 REASONS FOR RECE tV tNG TECHNOLOGY FREE
REASONS FOR NO PAYMENT FORErCN BRAZILtAN TOTAL
Technology from parent company 12 12
Previous relationship with supplier 5 5
Problems with INPI 5 1 6
Publ Ic domain or Int'l assoc. 1 2 3
It Is Interesting to note that, from the data used In Chapter 3 , 8 of the
12 firms that reported having received free technology from their parent com-
panies had other contracts with thetr parent companies where payments are In-
volved, Five of these 8 had contracts with payment as percentage of sales.
It Is Impossible to tell whether technology received free, some cases of which
were due to problems of regTstertng with INPI, were In fact paid for Implicit-
ly through other contracts, or through other transfer pricing devices. However,
this does indicate an area of weakness in the control system.
Another point worthy of note Is that the control system may In fact put
Brazilian firms at a disadvantage compared with foreign firms, A foreign
subsidiary can continue to receive technology from Its parent company when
the agreement Is pending before INPI or even when there Is no agreement. In
which case the control system Is completely bypassed. But It Is unlikely a
Brazilian firm will get any technology until the agreement and payment have
been approved by INPI, except when It can rely on the good-will of a former
suppl ler,
'4.3 Cases of Technology Transfer
The firms Interviewed were asked to Identify a recent significant tech-
nological change In their firms that Involved obtaining technology from a
foreign supplier. Then questions were asked concerning the change, the
search and evaluation process In obtaining the technology, the transfer pro-
cess and the interaction with the government control system,
l».3.1 Type of Technological Change Involved
The type of technology change for the cases are summarized as follows:
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TABLE k.8 THE CASES OF TECHNOLOGY CHANGE
TECHNOLOGY CHANGE INVOLVED
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/4.3.2 Equtpmeht Purchase
tt Is noted that technological changes Involving technology transfer
from abroad are frequently accompanted by equipment purchases, ThIrty-sIx
of the ^5 cases (80i) Included the purchase of equipment as part of the
technology change. Furthermore, 30 of those 36 firms also gave an estimate
of the proportion of the equipment that was purchased from abroad. There
was only one case where the equipment was 100^ Brazilian, and the rest was
foreign equipment In various proportions In terms of the value of the total
purchase.
TABLE ^-10 PURCHASE OF IMPORTED VERSUS LOCAL EQU I PHENT
PROPORTION OF EQUIP.. PURCHASED FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
80 - 1001 Imported 6 5 11
50 - 79% Imported 7 6 13
1 - ^9* Imported 1 h 5
100% Brazilian - 1 I
% unknown 5 1 6
TOTAL RESPONDED 19 17 36
Of the 30 cases where the estimated proportion was given, 2k (80%) were
more than half Imported and 11 were more than Z0% Imported. There Is no dif-
ference between foreign and Brazilian firms In this respect. However, In the
6 cases where more than half of the equipment was purchased locally, 5 were
Brazil Ian firms.
This points out an area of weakness tn the control system for technology
transfer In that Implicit technology transfer (through machinery and equip-
ment) and explicit technology transfer (through contractual arrangements) are
frequently complementary, yet the control for these transfers fs dispersed.-
While the control for explicit transfer Is In the hands of INPf, Import li-
censes are granted under CACEX CBoard of External Commerce) of the Bank of
Brazil. From the government's point of view, the dispersion of authority may
dilute the effectiveness of the control. From the firms' point of view, they
would have to deal with two bureaucracies that may cause delays and conflicts.
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4.3.3 Reasons for the Chahge
The reasons for undertakfng the technology change were gfven as follows:
TABLE ^.11 REASONS FOR UNDERTAKtNG TECHNOLOGY CHANGE
REASONS FOR CHANGE
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often create a demand for Imported technology, at least In the short term.
Jn the Intermediate term, foreign technology may sttll be needed for incre-
mental Improvements of the product or the manufacturing process. Although
quality Improvement of the product Ts the second most frequently cited rea-
son resulting In the purchase of foretgn technology. It Is not known how many
of these cases refer to products that were recently Import-substituted,
Surprisingly perhaps, reduction In production cost only ranks fourth
among the reasons for changes Involvtng technology transfer. Eight firms
(18% of kk firms that responded) gave this reason for the change and 6 of
these are foreign firms. It would thus appear that technology transfer Is
more frequently related to sales-oriented market conditions than production
conditions.
The last two categories of reasons are more passive and reactive In
character and they are divided among foreign and Brazilian firms with no
overlaps. Four foreign subsidiaries stated that their parent companies de-
cided to Introduce the technology In Brazil after It was Introduced else-
where within the multinational family. Pour Brazilian firms stated that the
new technology was needed to maintain their market positions.
^.3-^ Product Line For Which Technology Was Imported
As noted In ^.3.1 , 2k cases of the technology changes were for products
newly manufactured by the firms and 21 cases were for already existing pro-
ducts. These are about evenly divided between foreign and Brazilian firms.
Although the changes started In different years, more than 80% of the cases
occurred during the period 1972 to 1975. Thirty-three firms gave the domes-
tic market share In 197'« for the product In question as follows:
TABLE '.12 DOMESTIC MARKET SHARES
DOMESTIC MARKET SHARE IN 197'*
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Among the 23 cases where production had started and the market shares
known, 13 or more than half of these cases rnvolved market shares of 50% or
more. Also, fn ]k of these cases (7 foreign firms, 7 Brazlltan firms) the
product was also exported. However, the export market was generally unim-
portant as only 7 firms (5 foreign, 2 Brazilian] exported more than S% of
what they produced In 197i» and only 1 firm exported more than ]0%,
When asked who the firms considered as their major competitors In the
domestic market for the product line, the responses were as follows (2A for-
eign firms, 21 Brazilian firms):
TABLE ^.13 MAJOR COMPETITORS IN DOMESTIC MARKET
MAJOR COMPETITORS
IN DOMESTIC MARKET
(not mutually exclusive)
FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Subsidiaries of foreign firms
Brazilian firms with foreign
technology
Brazilian firms with local
technology
Firms abroad exporting to Brazil
No major competition
19
8
7
1
13
11
5
3
32
19
12
Foreign subsidiaries were by far the most Important source of competi-
tion and were Identified by 73% of the foreign firms and 62% of the Brazilian
firms. Brazilian firms with foreign technology were next In Importance with
33% of the foreign firms and 52i of the Brazilian firms reporting so. Then
the next Important source of competition was from firms located abroad but
exporting to Brazil. It Is apparent that the firms considered themselves
competing primarily with other firms manufacturing with foreign technology.
Another characteristic of the product line applies only in the case of the
2k foreign firms In the sample. Among 21 responses, 18 firms characterized
the product as essentially the same as that produced by the parent company
and only 3 firms Indicated that there were significant modifications made to
the product manufactured in Brazil.
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k.k Search, Eval ugt ton qhd Dectstoh Prbces-s
4.^.1 Al ternat fve Suppi ters. Cons Mered
Alternattve suppi Ters consfdered were deftned to be supplfers other
than the one fTnally chosen and whtch the receiving firm had Initiated
written or personal contact with and sought Information from,
TABLE ^.]k NUMBER OP ALTERNATtVE SUPPirERS CONSIDERED
NO. OF ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
None \k 7 21
1-2 5 9 \k
3-5 k 5 9
More than 5 - 2 2
TOTAL RESPONDED 23 . 23 kS
The search activity for both foreign and Brazilian firms appear to be
very limited. Thirty-five out of k€> ftrms (76%) considered two alternative
suppliers or less for the technology they obtained. Twenty-one firms {.hG%
of kS) did not consider any alternative suppliers at all, and there are twice
as many foreign firms In this category as there are Brazilian ones. The rea-
son for this became clearer when the firms* relationship wtih the supplier
was determined. Among the ]k foreign firms that did not consider any alter-
natives, 12 were related to the supplier either directly or indirectly. In
10 cases the supplier was the parent company and in the other 2 cases the
technology came from another subs^d^ary of the same multinational family. In
2 of the 7 Brazilian cases where no alternatives were considered, the suppli-
ers were also minority shareholders in the receiving firms.
Twenty-five firms (9 foreign, 16 Brazilian) had considered alternative
sources for the technology they needed. However, none of these alternatives
included local sources, neither Brazilian research institutes nor other Bra-
zilian firmsc The alternative suppliers considered were distributed geograph-
ically as fol lows:

- 3k
TABLE k.]S GEOGRAPHtC D>STRtBUTION OF
ALTERNATIVE SUPPLtERS CONS rPERED
COUNTRY OR REGION NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS
-
—
- -
--_--.
United States U
Western Europe kS
Japan 2
Others 7
TOTAL 71
The fact that no local alternatives had been considered Is a significant
one. Technological dependence on foreign sources Is a connnon Issue among de-
veloping countries. But the phenomenon appears to be one of a vicious circle
where the causal relationship Is not clear. The dependence on foreign techno-
logy Is perhaps both a result and a cause of laclc of local sources of supply.
In the case of Brazil, there are many research Institutions, primarily govern-
ment funded, operating In most major sectors. However, It appears that they
are seldom used as a source of connmerctal Industrial technology. This finding
Is also reported In another project^ of this research program Jointly conduc-
ted by M.J.T.'s Center for Policy Alternatives and the Funda^ao Carlos Aiberto
Vanzollnl of the University of S3o Paulo,
it.ij.Z Important Sources of information Used In Selection
Forty-two firms (21 foreign, 21 Brazilian) gave the following responses
concerning the Important sources of Information used In the selection process:
TABLE '4.16 MAJOR SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED FOR SELECTION
IMPORTANT INFORMATION SOURCES FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
(not mutually exclusive)
The supplier 15 15 30
Other firms In the industry 5 8 13
Field trips overseas 6 5 11
-continued-
L} Characteristics of Technological Change To the Sao Paulo Firm, Andri
Ghlrardi, Moys6s Pluclennlk, and James M. Utterback. June 1976.
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TABLE i,.]6 Ccbntthued)
IMPORTANT INFORMATION SOURCES FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
(not mutually exclusive)
Publications 5 6 11
Foreign consultants 1 2 3
Brazilian consultants - 1 1
Trade fairs In Brazil - 1 1
.
Major customer - 1 1
Thirty firms cited the supplier Itself as the Important source of Infor-
mation. This Is the most frequently cited source for both foreign and Bra-
zilian firms. However, 11 of the 15 foreign firms In this category received
their technology from a related suppHer, and 10 of them cited the supplier
as their only Important source of Information. Among the 15 Brazilian firms
that gave the supplier as an Important source of Information, 5 firms cited
this as the only source and k firms had considered no other alternatives.
The second most frequently cited Important source of Information differs
between foreign and Brazilian firms, although the difference is small. For
foreign firms It Is Information gathered from field trips overseas, and for
Brazilian firms It Is Information from other firms In the Industry, At the
same time, about one-fourth of all the firms cited publications as an Impor-
tant source of Information, These Include Journals, trade magazines and other
forms of literature.
Worthy of note Is that few ffrms reported the use of outside Independent
consultants as an Important source of Information In evaluating potential sup-
pliers. Furthermore, none of the firms considered research Institutes or
government entitles as Important sources.
i4.i*.3 Feasibility Study
The firms interviewed were asked to describe how they evaluated the tech-
nology to be imported before the decision was made. Then the feasibility stu-
dies made were categorized into technical and financial types. The first type
is concerned with the technical or engineering aspects of the technology itself.
The second type includes studies that are financial in nature, such as sales or
profit forecasts, and market studies.
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TABLE A. 17 PEAS IBrirTY STUDIES
FEASIBILITY STUDIES MADE FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Yes
No
20
3
13
9
33
12
TOTAL RESPONDED 23 22 45
TABLE 4.18 TYPE OP FEASIBILITY STUDY MADE
STUDY MADE
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TABLE ft. 19 (contThued)
REASONS FOR NOT MAKING STUDY FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
(not mutual ly exclusfve}
Supplier Is well-known - 2 2
Technology from parent company 3 3
Seven of the nine Brazilian firms claimed that they relied on common
sense or business judgment In selecting their technology suppliers. Five of
these firms may be considered small relative to the population of the techno-
logy Importers In their sectors. Other firms cited that they did not have the
capacity to make the feasibility studies Internally and to have them done out-
side the firm would be expensive. Two firms also claimed that their suppliers
were well-known and it was unnecessary to make any study.
As for the 13 Brazilian firms that had made feasibility studies, there
seems to be a general lack of technical evaluation done. Only 8 of these
firms had made technical evaluations. Coupled with the fact that the major-
ity of firms relied on the suppliers themselves as the Important source of
information (see Section A.^^Z) , this would indicate an area of weakness In
the evaluation and negotiation phase of technology transfer In the case of
Brazil Ian firms.
in the case of foreign subs^d^a^^es, there are proportionately more
firms that had made feasibility studies. But 8 out of the 20 firms {kO%)
relied on studies made by the parent companies, 7 of which were also the
technology suppliers. There also seems to be a lack of technical evalua-
tion even when dealing with an unrelated supplier. Among 10 cases of for-
eign firms getting technology from unrelated suppliers, only 6 firms made
technical studies concerning the technology. This lack of emphasis on tech-
nical evaluation appears to be a general feature of technology transfer be-
havior among both foreign and Brazilian firms. This coincides with that
the most frequently-cited reasons for technology change (see Section ^.3- j&
are market or sales oriented rather than production oriented.
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k.k.i^ Principal Reasons For Chotce of Supplier
Forty-four firms (22 foreign, 22 Brazilian) gave the principal reasons
for selecting the technology supplier as follows:
TABLE A. 20 PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR CHOICE OF SUPPLIER
PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR CHOICE
(not mutually exclusive)
FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Prestige or reputation of supplier 6
Parent company or equity partner 13
Price of technology 5
Quality of technology 3
Previous relationship with 1
suppi ler
Approval of major customer 1
Only supplier available 2
Supplier's domestic distribution 1
channel
15
k
5
6
2
1
21
17
10
9
3
2
2
1
In the case of BrazlUan ffrms, 15 out of 22 firms (68?) cited the pres-
tige or reputation of the supplier as the main reason for their choice. Six
of these firms gave this as the only reason. Although this reason appears to
be rather subjective or Judgmental, It may be of more practical value to a
small or medium size firm, where the prestige of Its licensor or supplier can
help market Its products. As a matter of fact, among the 21 firms that cited
this reason, only 3 are large firms relative to technology Importers In their
sectors.
As for foreign firms, 13 out of 22 firms (59%) cited the reason for their
choice was that the supplier was their parent or sister company. Ten of them
gave this as the only reason. In comparison, the price and quality of the
technology are mentioned by only a few firms. It appears that the source of
direct investment has a very strong Influence over the choice of technology.
Once again, the technical aspects of the technology itself was not empha-
sized by many firms, whether foreign or Brazilian, Only 9 firms (20? of kk
firms) cited the quality of technology as an important reason for their choice.
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Almost all of the other reasons gtven were nonotechnlcal in nature.
k.k.S Level of Final Decfslon
Table 4.21 Level of Final Dectston
DECISION MADE BY FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Parent company 15 - 15
Board of directors of firm 7 22 29
TOTAL RESPONDED 22 22 kk
In the case of Brazilian firms, the final decision on the selection was
made by the board of directors with no exceptions. This Indicates that the
choice of technology suppliers Is a very high-level decision.
In the case of foreign firms, 15 out of 22 firms (68%) had their deci-
sions made outside of Brazil at their parent headquarters. If one traces
through the entire process of search, evaluation and selection among foreign
subsidiaries, the conclusion would be that there Is a very low level of Inde-
pendence In technological declstons. Brazil has a very large stock of direct
foreign Investments (about US $ 6 billion at year end of 197^, according to
the Central Bank) which accounts for a significant portion of the economy.
VIsao's ig?** directory of 1000 largest Brazilian firms estimated that foreign
controlled firms accounted for 22, li of the assets and 36.61 of the sales,^
In some sectors, the foreign share of assets were as high as '(9.6% and the
share of sales as high as 61.8%. If the results of this study were general-
ized to all foreign-controlled firms, a very sizeable portion of the Brazilian
economy would have very little technological autonomy. This would Indicate
an area of conflict If official policy goals were to pursue more technological
autonomy and more direct foreign investments at the same time.
^.^i.d Determination of Appropriate Payment
When asked to identify the key factors in determining the appropriate
payment for the imported technology, 36 firms (19 foreign, 17 Brazilian) gave
IJi Robinson, Richard D, , National Efforts to Establish Guidelines For the
Behavior of Multinational Corporations, M.t.T,, Cambridge, 1975.
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the following responses:
TABLE k.ll KEY FACTORS fNDETERMrN I NG PAYMENTS
KEY FACTORS IN DETERMINING
PAYMENTS
FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Parent company decided 9
Business Judgment and experTence 1
Limits of BraztUan law k
Price of competing suppliers k
Supplier determined 1
Forecast of change In sales 1
Forecast of change In product ton 1
cost
9
6
8
7
k
k
2
When ranked by the absolute frequency of responses, foreign subsidiaries
cited parent company decision On all 9 cases the supplier was the parent com-
pany or sister company), limits of Brazilian law (In 3 of 4 cases the supplier
was the parent or sister company), and prtce of competing suppliers as the
key factors In determing payments.
The key factors cited by Brazilian firms are more dispersed, and In more
than half of the cases they were Indtcatlve of a weak evaluative and bargaining
capacity. First of all, the most frequently cited factor was business Judgment
and experience, which Is vague and ad hoc. Then In 7 of the remaining cases,
the key factors used In determing payments were externally Imposed (limits
of Brazilian law and supplier determined), versus only 3 cases where the key
factor was the price of competing suppliers. Coupled with the fact that al-
most a third of the Brazilian firms had not considered any alternative sup-
ptrers (Section ^'^-Q , the reliance on the supplier as the Important source
of Information (Section ^•^.2) , the lack of feasibility studies made (Section
^.4.3) , this does Indicate an area of weakness among Brazilian firms in the
process of purchasing foreign technology.
k.k.J Characteristics of the Supplier Chosen

k]
TABLE it. 23 PRtNCrPAL ACTtVtTY OF THE SUPPLIER
PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY OF SUPPLIER
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for the technology transferred, and were unrelated to the BrazlUan firms
before the transactions.
TABLE '.25 SUPPLIER ALSO CUSTOMER OF THE FIRM
SUPPLIER ALSO A CUSTOMER
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4-5 Transfer Process
4-5. 1 Nature of the Technology Imported
TABLE 4.27 TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY IMPORTED
TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY FOREIGN BRAZILIAM TOTAL
Patent, trademark S tech, services k 7 11
.
Patent and tech, services h 2 S
Trademark and tech. services 2 3 5
Technical services only 11 10 21
Machinery only .2 1 3
TOTAL RESPONDED 23 23 k6
The 46 cases of technology transfer Included 22 cases which were related
to the licensing of patents or trademarks, 21 cases of non-proprietary tech-
nical Information and services only, and 3 cases of machinery only. Except
for the 3 cases of machinery purchase and 2 cases of technical services re-
ceived by foreign subsidiaries from their parent companies, all the other 41
cases Involved a formal technology agreement submitted to INPI for approval.
The 10 agreements by foreign firms involving the use of Industrial property
(I.e. patents and trademarks) are particularly Interesting, as Brazilian law
prohibits royalty payments for Industrial property between subsidiaries and
their foreign parents. Five of these 10 agreements would fall under this
provision, but only 1 Involved no payment. This agreement specified patent
and trademark only, whereas all the other 4 Included 'technical assistance'
and were paid on the basis of percentage of sales. This may suggest that
foreign subsidiaries are using technical assistance as a possible loophole
in the control system to remit payments to their parents.
4.5-2 Implicit Conditions Under the Agreement
One of INPI's primary functions in screening technology agreements is to
curtail restrictive conditions that limit the activities of the receiver or
hinder the dissemination or continued use of the technology after the agreement
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expires. These restrictive conditions Include tled-sourcfng of Intermediate
Inputs, export restrictions, licensor's proprietory rights to Improvements on
the patents, confidentiality clauses beyond period of validity of agreement,
and conditions restricting the production or marketing of the product. It was
obviously difficult for the firms Interviewed to admit to any of these condi-
tions and hence some of the following tabulations were undoubtedly underesti-
mated. Even so, many of the firms Interviewed, especially among the Brazilian
ones, Indicated Implicit 'gentlemen's agreements' between them and the sup-
pliers as necessary conditions In getting the technology. The following tabu-
lation excludes k firms (2 Brazilian, 2 foreign) that did not respond, and the
13 cases of foreign firms where the supplier Is the parent or sister company,
as unambiguous management control by the parent companies could clearly Im-
pose any conditions they wanted.
TABLE ^.28 CONDITIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFER
(not mutually exclusive)
FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Exclusive use of technology In
Brazil
Confidentiality beyond perfod
of formal agreement
Export restrictions
Supplier entitled to Improve-
ments on technology
Minimum payments necessary
Purchase of Intermediate Inputs
from suppl ler
Obi Igatory renewal of contract
Agreement of sales to supplier.
7
3
2
4
3
2
14
8
5
13
4
6
2
1
21
11
7
17
7
8
2
.1
TOTAL NO. OF FIRMS 10* 23 33
* Only firms not controlled by suppliers are Included.
It Is noted that 7 out of 10 foreign firms (70%) and \k out of 23 Brazil-
ian firms (61%) had exclusive use of the technology In Brazil. In the rest
of the cases, the supplier could presumably sell the technology to another firm.
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In 11 cases (8 Brazilian, 3 foretgnl, the fTrms reported they had agreed
to maintain confidentiality of the technology even after the termination of
the agreement as approved by INPI, In most cases Indefinitely. It Is noted
that 7 (5 Brazilian, 2 foreTgn) of these 11 cases Involved Industrial secrets
not protected by patents.
Seven firms reported that they had agreed not to export to certain coun-
tries the product for which the technology was used. Four of these cases (all
Brazilian) involved unpatented technology. For the other 3 cases Involving
patents, It is not Icnown whether the supplier had working licenses in those
countries. One Brazilian firm admitted that the export restriction was re-
jected by the government authorities but was Included implicitly. Although
not Included In the above tabulations, 2 foreign subsidiaries explained that
formal restrictions were not necessary since the parent companies made all the
export decisions. Even though not admitted explicitly, this obviously could
be extended to all foreign subisidlarles and all Intra-company decisions over
which the parent company exercises control. Witness the Influence of the
parent company over the selection and pricing of technology to a subsidiary
as described in previous sections.
Other conditions between the two parties frequently cited include grant-
back provisions of Improvement on the technology, purchase of parts and com-
ponents from the supplier and payment of minimum royalties. Fewer mentions
were made about obligatory renewal of the contract and sales agreement with
the suppl ier.
k.5.3 Method of Transfer
The methods used for transferring the technology fall under three broad
categories, hardware(includlng machinery. Instruments, dies, molds and matri-
ces), documentation (Including drawings, designs, specifications, technical
data, formulae, blueprints and operating manuals), and people (including pre-
sentation of services and Instructions). Almost all of the transfers included
the last two categories:
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TABLE 4.29 METHOD FOR TRANSFERRING THE TECHNOLOGY
MODE OF TRANSFER FOREtGN
Documentatfon
Training of Brazilian tech-
nicians overseas
Short-term visits of foreign
technicians
Long-term residence of foreign
technicians In Brazil
Equipment and Instruments
Dies, molds and matrices
22
16
6
9
3
BRAZILIAN
19
18
13
3
3
3
TOTAL
41
32
29
9
12
6
TOTAL RESPONDED 2k 23 ^•7
Twenty-one of the k7 cases (JiS%) Involved both training of Brazilians
overseas and short-term visits of foreign technicians. Seven of these cases
also included long-term residence (jnore than 6 months) of foreign technicians.
4.5.'* Time Taken for Absorption
The time taken for absorption of the technology was defined to be the
time between when the technology change was Introduced and when It became
fully operational and Integrated Into the production process. Forty-one firms
(19 foreign, 22 Brazilian) responded as follows:
TABLE k.30 TIME FOR ABSORBING THE TECHNOLOGY
TIME FOR ABSORPTION FOREIGN
1 year or less
1 - 2 years
More than 2 years
Being implemented
14
k
1
BRAZILIAN
9
5
5
3
TOTAL
23
9
6
3
TOTAL RESPONDED 19 22 k}

-
i.7 -
It ?s noted that, proportTonately, foreign firms generally took less time
than Brazilian firms for absorbing the technology Introduced, In linking the
time needed for absorption to the estimated Internal technical capacity of the
firms as described In Secttbii^l -2 , it was found that the firms that were con-
sidered as having adequate capacity took less time for absorption. Using the
less conservative classification, 19 firms were considered as having adequate
Internal technical capacity* Among these firms, 3 did not give an estimate for
the absorption time and In 1 case the technology was being Implemented. But
In the remaining 15 cases, 11 took one year or less to absorb the technology,
2 took between 1 to 2 years, and 2 took more than 2 years.
It Is also Interesting to note that the time needed for absorption bore
no relationship to the duration of the technology agreement. The Intersection
of the two Is as follows:
TABLE '.31 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABSORPTION
TIME AND DURATION OF AGREEMENT
TIME FOR ABSORPTION DURATION OF AGREEMENT
1 YR. 3 YRS. 5 YRS,
TOTAL
1 year or less
1 - 2 years
More than 2 years
Being Implemented
Not available
1
1
2
13
8
k
3
19
9
6
3
k
TOTAL 32 ill
As can be seen, the duration of the agreement Is usually much longer than
the time needed for Implementing the technology. In fact, 7^% of the agree-
ments were for 5 years, the maximum allowable under INPI regulations, although
an agreement may be renewed for another 5 years If approved. This can be ex-
plained by that while the time for absorption Is related to the transfer of
technology the duration of the agreement Is related to payments for the tech-
nology. All the one-year agreements were paid in fixed sums, and all the 3"year
and 5-year agreements were paid based on percentage of sales except for four
agreements which involved periodic fixed payments and one agreement with no
payment involved.
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'•55 Transfer Probl ems and Cont thued Assistance Regu t red
Fourteen foreign ffrms received their technologies from related companies
and 7 Brazilian firms from their minority Joint-venture partners. All of
these firms perceived the performance of the technology Imported as satisfac-
tory or better than expected. The same Is true for the remaining 26 firms
ClO foreign, 16 Brazilian) except for 1 foreign firm that rated the perfor-
mance as unsatisfactory. However, many firms encountered problems during and
after the technology transfer. The problems encountered by the firms may be
separated Into those relating to government regulations and those that did not.
For the k] cases (19 foreign, 22 Brazilian) that Involved agreements
submitted to INPI for approval, 3^ firms (l^i foreign, 20 Brazilian) also gave
the time tal<en for approval. Eighteen of these 3^ cases (53?) took more than
6 months to obtain the approval. Furthermore, 30 firms (10 foreign, 20 Bra-
zilian) Indicated whether the agreement required alterations imposed by INPI
before the approval was given. Eighteen agreements were approved as they were
submitted and In 12 cases (5 foreign, 7 Brazilian) alterations were required.
Eight of these 12 agreements were among those that toolc more than 6 months for
approval. Some delays may be expected when alterations were required, but 7
such agreements toolc more than a year for approval and 5 of these originated
from Brazilian firms. There were also 8 agreements with no alterations that
took more than six months to approve. Although It Is not known how much of
the delay was due to INPI or the firms themselves, many of the firms claimed
that delays were costly to them, and that INPI was understaffed. It was found
that INPI had a staff that varied between 10 to 15 people at times that were
responsible for screening about 1500 agreements or Invoices per year, which
tends to substantiate the claims made by the firms.
Four firms, all Brazilian, encountered difficulties In obtaining Import
licenses for parts and components Involved In the technology transfer, and 8
firms (6 foreign, 2 Brazilian) also had problems for Imported equipment.
These will be treated in more detail In the next section.
Problems not related to government regulations were as follows:
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TABLE ltJ2 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURtNG OR AFTER TRANSFER
PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED FORErCN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Lack of technical personnel h 1 5
Local supply of parts and com- I k 5
ponents
Operation of the technology ^37
Problem with technology suppHer 2 13
Other problems 2 1 3
No major problems 11 ]k 25
TOTAL NO. OF FIRMS 21 22 43
Twenty-eight firms (16 foreign, 12 Brazilian) {(>Q%) also claimed that
continued technical assistance from the supplier was necessary even after the
Implementation of the technology. The assistance required Is categorized
Into two types. The first type Is technical services required occasionally
for operating the technology that was transferred, such as quality control or
Inspection, machine maintenance, and trouble-shooting for specific technical
problems* The second type Is more Informational In nature and related to new
Ideas, changes or Improvements on the technology and updates on current and
competing technologies.
TABLE ^-13 CONTINUED EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE REQUIRED
CONTINUED EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Servicing or operating the tech- 7 2 9
no logy
New Ideas, changes or Improvements k 7 11
Both 5 3 8
Not required 8 11 19
TOTAL RESPONDED 2k 23 '»7
It Is Interesting to note that 10 out of the 16 foreign firms that re-
quired continued technical assistance from the suppliers had a steady and
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secure source of technology In that the suppliers were thetr parent companies.
This locked-ln and yet readily available source may also explain why there
are more foreign than Brazilian firms (12 to 5) that rely on their suppliers
for the servicing type of contlned assistance,
i\.S.G Perceived Effects on Other Firms
Thirty-five firms (17 foreign, 18 Brazilian) reported that the technology
transfer had Important effects on other firms In Brazil, These were categor-
ized Into effects on local suppliers or subcontractors of the firms, their
customers and their competitors.
TABLE k.3k POST TRANSFER EFFECTS ON OTHER FIRMS IN BRAZIL
EFFECTS ON LOCAL FIRMS FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
1, Subcontractors:
New business generated 12 6 18
Production of higher *» 3 7
quality Inputs
New training or techno- 2 13
logy acquired
2, Customers:
Import substitution k 6 10
Better quality product k k 6
Higher productivity In 2 2 A
customers' production
Lower cost product 2-2
Training of customers' 1 - 1
technicians
3, Competitors:
Stimulated search for 5 3 8
similar technology
Lost market share 1 5 6
New competitors entered 1 2 3
market
Stimulated change In tech- 3 "3
nology
AvalUbll Ity of trained 1 - I
personnel
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Eighteen firms claimed ttkat the technology they acquired had resulted
In the generation of new business for thetr local subcontractors. Thus In
about half of the cases (18 out of 35l there was an Increase In the demand
for local parts and materials after the technology transfer. Seven firms
also reported that their subcontractors Improved the quality of what they
produced due to new requirements.
As for the firms' customers, the most frequently cited effect Is Import
substitution. Ten firms claimed that their products substituted for what their
customers were Importing previously. Eight firms reported that the technology
had resulted In better quality products for their customers and k firms also
claimed that higher quality Inputs Induced higher productivity In their custo-
mers' production. However, only 2 firms reported lowering the cost of their
products to the customer as a result of the technology transfer. But It should
also be noted that reduction In production cost was considered by only a few
firms as a major reason for undertaking the technology change (see Section
'•3.31
.
It appears that one of the Important effects of technology transfer is
the stimulation of demand for similar technology. Eleven firms (31% of 35
firms) reported that their competitors either adopted similar technology
changes or started searching for similar technology after they Introduced the
technology changes In their firms. It is Interesting to note that 8 foreign
firms reported this effect on their competitors while only 3 Brazilian firms
did so. At the same time, 5 out of the 6 firms that claimed their competitors
had lost some of their marlcet shares were Brazilian. Referring bacic to Sec-
tion 4.3.3 concerning the major reasons for undertaking the technology change,
almost twice as many foreign firms cited new domestic market as the reason
compared to Brazilian firms while all the firms that cited the need to main-
tain their market positions were Brazilian firms. This would lead one to hy-
pothesize that more foreign firms Introduce Imported technology as an aggres-
sive market action and a pioneering one with respect to the Brazilian market,
while more Brazilian firms do so out of defensive reaction. But a longitudi-
nal study of a given product line, rather than a cross-sectional study like
the present one, would be necessary to verify this rigorously.
Finally, ft is worthy of note that the direct spin-off of training out-
side of the receiving firm tend to be limited. It is impossible to tell how

52
much Indirect training activities had resulted from the technology transfer
and the longer-term mobility of trained technicians, but only 5 firms (k for-
eign and 1 Brazilian) reported the provision of training to third parties.
Three firms provided for their local suppliers as a result of the technology
transfer, one firm trained the customer and one firm lost some of Its trained
personnel to Its competitor.
k.S Experience with the Government Contrbl System
One part of this study focussed on the experience of the firms in dealing
with the government control system In Importing technology. These primarily
Involved dealing with INPI in registering the technology agreement, obtaining
permission from the Central Bank to remit payments In foreign exchange, and
obtaining licenses and fiscal Incentives from CACEX for Importing machinery
and Intermediate Inputs.
^.6.1 Disposition of Agreements Submitted to INPI
Among the k\ cases (19 foreign, 22 Brazilian) that Involved the submis-
sion of a formal technology agreement to INPI for approval, ^k firms (14 for-
eign, 20 Brazilian) indicated the time lapse between when the agreement was
first submitted to when the approval was given.
TABLE ^.35 TIME TAKEN FOU APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT BY INPI
TIME TAKEN FOR APPROVAL FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Less than 3 months 3 3 6
3-6 months k 6 10
6 months - 1 year "3 k 7
More than 1 year k 7 11
TOTAL RESPONDED 14 20 3^
As noted before In Section ^.SA a substantial proportion of the agree-
ments took a long time to be approved. About half of the agreements took less
than 6 months to approve and about half took more, with 11 agreements (32% of
34) taking more than a year.
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However, It should be pointed out that 8 of the 18 agreements that took
longer than 6 months for approval had alterations In the agreements required
by INPI, which accounted for part of the delay. But, as also mentioned be-
fore, It was found that INPI had only 10 to 15 staff members evaluating about
1500 agreements and Invoices per year. Considering the complexity of their
tasks. It Is perhaps not surprising that delays frequently occurred. Further-
more, some of the business executives Interviewed suggested there were also
political reasons for the more recent delays as part of the government's ef-
forts to discourage the short-term outflow of foreign exchange In the face
of a balance-of-payment crisis.
Thirty firms (10 foreign, 20 Brazilian) Indicated whether the agreements
were approved by INPI with alterations required.
TABLE A .36 ALTERATIONS REQUIRED BY INPI
ALTERATIONS REQUIRED BY INPI

5h -
ment was permitted and the supplier subsequently used part of the payment to
purchase equity In the Brazilian firm. This perhaps points to another weak-
ness In the control system. While INPI did not permit the exchange of equity
for technology, there Is no restriction on the Inflow of foreign Investment
which merely has to be registered with the Central Bank, Hence a foreign
technology supplier can Invest the payment It receives for Its technology In
the receiving firm at any time as long as a 'gentlemen's agreement' has been
worked out beforehand. In fact, this survey data revealed S cases where the
foreign supplier became a minority shareholder In the Brazilian firm. An ex-
offlclal of INPI Interviewed acknowledged this loophole and Indicated that It
would have been better If INPI permitted equity exchange so that It knows more
completely what was being transacted. If the technology payment were later
converted Into foreign Investment the transaction would only go through the
Central Bank and without INPI's knowledge.
'4.6.2 Ass I stance From I NP
I
Sections A -6.
2
to ^.6.4 are concerned with the firms' general experience
In dealing with INPI and the Central Bank In technology transfer and are not
restricted to the cases discussed before. Together A3 firms In the sample
had submitted a total of II8 agreements to INPI since It began screening agree-
ments In 1972. The dispositions of these agreements were as follows:
TABLE 1».37 DISPOSITION OF AGREEMENTS SUBMITTED TO I NP'
DISPOSITION OF AGREEMENTS FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Approved kO 55 95
Rejected 3 1 k
Alterations being negotiated 8 4 12
Being examined for first time 1 6 7
TOTAL NO. OF AGREEMENTS 52 66 118
TOTAL NO. OF FIRMS 20 23 *3
There were *» agreements that were rejected on the basis of the firms' non-
compl lance with INPI requirements. One firm attempted to renew an agreement for
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more than ftve years and another f trm attempted to register a trademark agree-
ment for 15 years (regulation Umtt ts 5 years). Another agreement was re-
jected on the basis that payments were not permitted between subsidiary and
parent company for Industrial property. Finally, one foreign firm merely re-
plied that the rejection was due to non-compliance with what INPI required
and Mould not comment further.
As for agreements which had alterations demanded by INPI, the type of
alterations were as follows:
TABLE ^.30 ALTERATIONS REQUIRED BY INPI
TYPE OF ALTERATION FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
(not mutually exclusive)
Payment 6 2 8
Duration of agreement 1 12
Restrictive clauses 3 2 5
Legal format of agreement k 3 7
As far as assistance from INPI was concerned, 37 firms (19 foreign, 18
Brazilian) claimed they had never received any while A firms (1 foreign, 3
Brazilian) reported that INPI was helpful to them In negotiating with the for-
eign technology supplier. One Brazilian firm received some assistance In le-
gal matters concerning the agreement. The other three firms claimed that
INPI's Intervention helped In the negotiations with the supplier and one of
these firms claimed that the supplier accepted lower payments as a result.
But these were Incidental cases and by-products of the registration process
as neither the firms actively sought nor INPI actively gave assistance as
part of the Institutional function.
k.6.3 Problems With Central Bank
When payments to the exterior are Involved, a technology agreement must
be registered with the Central Bank after It has been registered with INPI.
It has been reported^ that the key permission for technology purchase rests
/I Slemsen, Peter Dirk, Licensing of Industrial Property and Transfer of
iVrhnnlnqy In Rrayii, paper presented at Inter-American Association of Indus-
trlal Property Briefing Conference, Chicago, May 1975,
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with INPt, as the registration with the Central Bank Is practically automatic
once approval from INPI has been granted. Thts vtas generally supported by the
findings of this study. Thirty-two firms (jBO? of 40 firms that responded) re-
ported they did not have any problems In registering their agreements with the
Central Bank, Only 8 firms (5 foreign, 3 Brazilian) claimed they experienced
delays In dealing with the Central Bank but all eventually obtained the regis-
tration. Six firms (3 foreign, 3 Brazilian) also encountered problems In docu-
mentations needed to obtain the foreign exchange authorization to remit the
technology payments. All but one of these firms blamed the delays on the
Bank's bureaucracy while one firm felt It lacked experience In the procedures.
It should be noted that government bureaucracy and complex regulations and
procedures concerning INPI, the Central Bank and CACEX were common complaints
among the firms Interviewed. To some extent, these complaints may be substan-
tiated by two pieces of evidence. The first Is that in the course of Inter-
views conducted In this study, mid-level government officials who actually
carried out the work had given confusing and conflicting descriptions of the
control system. The second Is that many of the firms relied on specialized
personnel In dealing with government agencies. The larger firms had their own
legal staff while the smaller ones frequently used 'despachantes' or quasi-
legal firms that sell their services to clients who need help In processing
documents through government agencies. It Is Interesting to note that the
Venezuelan government Is organizing courses In rules and procedures to be
given by their counterpart to INPI for firms Importing technology,
4.6.4 Government Inspection
Forty-two firms (18 foreign, 2k Brazilian) responded to whether there were
any government audit or Inspection concerning the technology they received and
paid for under the agreements registered with INPI and the Central Bank. Forty
firms (17 foreign, 23 Brazilian) reported there were never any Inspections, al-
though two of these firms (both foreign) had received visits from government
officials not directly related to the technology transfer. One firm was visi-
ted by officials from the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE) because
the plant was constructed with financing from the Bank, Another firm was vi-
sited by CACEX officials who Inspected the machinery that was Imported. Only
2 firms, a Brazilian firm In chemicals and a foreign firm In mechanical equip-
ment, had been visited by INPI officials subsequent to the registration of
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the technology agreements. In both cases, the agreements were transfers of
non-proprietory Industrial secrets and payments were based on percentage of
sales. In the first case, the officials examined the chemical formulae and
the manufacturing process that were Imported, In the second case, the offi-
cials Inspected the physical production Installations,
As Is apparent, the post-transfer audit function of INPI and the Central
Bank was extremely limited. This perhaps represents the biggest gap In the
control system for technology transfer. Regardless of how thorough or sophis-
ticated INPI makes Its screening process prior to the registration of the
agreements, much of these efforts would be quite futile If the control In-
cludes no follow-up evaluation or action. It would be impossible to deter-
mine the relationship between payments made and what was In fact transferred,
or whether contractual conditions required by INPI were adhered to, or what
base quantities were used for percentage-sales agreements. These problems
are all the more relevant considering the fact that during the period 1972 to
mld-1975, agreements between foreign subsidiaries and their related parties
abroad account for 22.9^ of all percentage-sales agreements and 30.7^ of the
payments approved by INPI for private firms (i.e. excluding government enter-
prises and entitles). Needless to say, these transactions are more open to
inter-firm manipulation than others. This potential probl em is a significant
one as it has been pointed out in Section k.k that decision-making concerning
technology transactions frequently resides at the parent headquarter.
In response to what can demonstrate the transfer of technology, 36 firms
suggested that several forms of physical evidence may be used. These Included
the examination of documents such as designs, blueprints, technical data and
invoices. Inspections of the product and the production facilities and the
physical presence of foreign technicians. These are undoubtedly rather sim-
plistic answers to a very complex question as to what can and should be in-
spected and audited In technology transfer. Nonetheless, the lack of post-
auditing is a major weakness in the control system and an area that deserves
much more attention.

- 58
Ji.G.5 Government tncenttves
The followtng sectfon refers to the cases specff fcal 1y, Forty firms (18
foreign, 22 Brazilian) responded to whether the case of technology transfer
was directly or Indirectly related to the following types of fiscal Incentive
from the government!
TABLE ^.39 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES RELATED TO THE TRANSFER
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVE FOREIGN BRAZILIAN TOTAL
Tax and duty exemption for
imported equipment
Tax and duty exemption for
imported materials and parts
Export Incentives
Government financing
Government as purchaser
No incentives
12
8
7
2
2
2
12
k
7
6
1
7
24
12
14
8
3
9
TOTAL NO. OF FIRMS 18 22 ko
It appears that the majority of the technology transfer transactions
(31 out of 40, or 77% of the cases] Involved either directly or Indirectly
some form of government Incentive. Only 9 firms (2 foreign, 7 Brazilian) had
not solicited any government Incentives. It Is Interesting to note that only
1 of these 9 firms may be considered large relative to Its sector with all the
rest being of small or medium size. Another study^ conducted Jointly by the
Center for Policy Alternatives and the Funda^So Carlos Alberto Vanzolinl has
also found that among firms In SSo Paulo larger firms had more access to gov-
ernment Incentives.
For the 29 firms (l4 foreign, 15 Brazilian) that had Imported equipment
as part of the technology transfer (see Section 4.3.2) 24 firms had obtained
tax and duty exemptions (which can add up to about 50% of the purchase value).
Two more firms (1 foreign, 1 Brazilian) had sought the exemptions but were re-
^1 Characteristics of Technological Change In the Sao Paulo Firm, Andre
Ghirardi, Moys^s Pluciennik and James M. Utterback, Center for Policy Alter-
natives Working Paper, Cambridge, April 1976,
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Jected on the bas?s that there were national similars to the Imported equip-
ment. The foreign firm acknowledged the existence of a national similar but
claimed that the local manufacturer could not deliver fast enough. Fifteen
(A foreign, 11 Brazilian) of the 24 firms that had obtained the tax exemptions
from CACEX reported they encountered no problems In meeting the requirements
of the law of similars. Seven firms (5 foreign, 2 Brazilian) had problems and
spilt their equipment purchase Into part national and part foreign to obtain
the exemptions.
The second most frequently obtained Incentive was export Incentives, Four-
teen firms (7 foreign, 7 Brazilian) sought and obtained Incentives for exporting
the product that was Involved In the technology transfer. However, it should
be pointed out again that the technology transfers were primarily for servicing
the domestic marlcet as only 7 firms exported more than S% of the product, and
among them only one exported more than 101.
The next category of Incentives were tax and duty exemptions for Imported
parts and materials. Eight foreign and k Brazilian firms obtained these exemp-
tions. There was another foreign firm that solicited these exemptions but was
denied on the grounds of national similars.
In 8 of the kO cases the firms had also obtained government financing In
the form of loans from development banks for the Investments for new plant
facilities. Six of these are Brazilian firms. It should be noted that under
Brazilian law foreign-controlled enterprises are denied access to long-term
loans from government Institutions unless the Investment project Is considered
by CDt (Council of Industrial Development) of the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce to be of national priority In economic development.
Finally, the role of the government as a purchaser In these cases of tech-
nology transfer was minimal. Only 3 firms, all of which are In the metallur-
gical sector, reported having government Institutions as customers for the pro-
duct Involved In the technology transfer.

Chapter 5- Assessment of the Control Systerri and its Implementation
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Chapter 5- Assessment of the Control System and Its Implementation
Earlier in Chapter one it was hypothesized that (a) there are substantial
gaps between stated objectives and implementation of the control system, and
(b) the control system is less effective in dealing with local subsidiaries of
foreign firms than with Brazilian-controlled local firms. Both hypotheses tend
to be supported by evidence revealed in the last three chapters concerning the
structure of the control system, the technology transfer agreements processed,
and the behavior of the recipient firms under the system. The following discus-
sion will reiterate and integrate some of the findings that led to this con-
clus ion.
As described in section 2.2, the Industrial Property Code established by
Presidential Decree Law No. 5-772 of December 1971 gave INPI the responsibility
of "registering and regulating all acts and contracts of technology transfer".
The broad objectives and guidelines that were established (see p. 6) will now
be evaluated according to their implementation.
- To favor importation of technology over importation of capital or goods
Presumably this means INPI would prefer technology being transferred via
armslength contractual agreements rather than through the channels of foreign
direct investment and trade. However, as was pointed out in Chapter two, INPI
has no jurisdiction over the import of foreign capital or goods, which are under
the control of the Central Bank and CACEX (Bank of Brazil) respectively. In fact,
the import of 'embodied' technology (i.e. capital goods like machinery and equip-
ment) are also under CACEX's control, and not INPI's. As a rough indicator of
the relative significance of the three areas of jurisdiction. Central Bank
figures for 197'* showed actual technology payments of US$23't million, inflow of
foreign direct investment of US$1, ^^8 million, and imports of US$12.63 billion.
Besides the dispersion of control authority, INPI's implementation of this
objective perhaps also suffers from Brazil's relatively open and encouraging
policy towards foreign direct investment. The classic counter-example to this
is perhaps Japan's policy up until the mid 60 ' s of being extremely restrictive
towards the import of foreign capital and goods, while actively promoting the
transfer of technology to Japanese firms through licensing agreements. Easy
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entry of foreign capital would reduce the incentive to license the technology
to a locally-controlled firm.
Despite these major drawbacks, INPI does have a regulation that seems
related to this objective. That is, INPI will not approve agreements whereby
the foreign supplier receives equity shares in the recipient firm as payment
for its technology (a sort of de facto direct investment). However, the survey
shows that this was easily and frequently circumvented by the two parties in-
volved through gentlemen's agreements whereby the technology payment received
by the supplier is reinvested in the recipient firm by registering it as foreign
capital with the Central Bank, thus bypassing INPI completely (see sections
k.k.7 and k.G.])
.
- To acquire technology instead of renting it
- To eliminate contractual or implicit restrictions for local absorption
and dissemination
- To avoid secrecy clauses or prohibition to continue production after
termination whereby know-how agreements become patents for unlimited
terms
- To increase exports, particularly of industrial products, avoiding
market limitations through trademark licensing
These guidelines are related in that INPI would like the recipient firms
to have greater control over the transferred technology. Under these guidelines,
INPI will not approve agreements that contain such restrictive clauses. In theory,
this would eliminate some past abuses of restrictive control by the technology
supplier. However, in practice, these measures tend to create unfavorable biases
against Brazilian-controlled recipient firms. Since the technology supplier would
lose some essential control and benefits resulting from selling the technology
than would otherwise be the case, these conditions would tend to raise the price
of the technology and/or reduce its availability to the locally-controlled firm
(see, for example, arguments by Jack Behrman and Harvey Wal lender in S. Holland
1976). The survey shows that foreign-controlled recipient firms obtain most of
their technology from their parents (see ^.'.7), which also make most of the
decisions concerning the transfers (see '.'4.5 and ^.^.6). Executives of several
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MNC subsidiaries in the survey asserted these requirements are irrelevant in
their cases when the parent companies exercise essential control (see '.5.2),
Even for some Brazilian-controlled firms obtaining technology at armslength,
INPI's success in removing restrictive clauses from the contracts may not
prevent implicit gentlemen's agreements of compromises between the two parties.
In fact, the survey shows this indeed occurred (see ^.5.2).
- To evaluate the technology to be imported
This guideline is somewhat vague. Presumably it implies the evaluation of
the benefits resulting from the transfer rather than the technology itself.
However, INPI has not established systematic and objective criteria for such
evaluations. Instead, it relies on the recipient firm's own assessment and
forecast of the potential benefits from the technology transfer, which are
submitted with the application for approval. How the information is actually used
and costs/benefits weighted is not known. But the virtual absence of post-
registration monitoring and auditing of actual results of transfer (see A. 6.^)
casts doubts on the implementation of this objective. This study also found
that INPI had only ten to twelve staff members, mostly economists and lawyers,
who are responsible for screening about 1,500 agreements per year. It is perhaps
not surprising that most of the firms interviewed complained about INPI's
bureaucracy and the long time required for approval (see 4.6.1). This again
raises the point of relative disadvantages of the Brazilian-controlled firm
under the system. A foreign subsidiary can continue to receive technology
from its parent company, and frequently does (see 4.2), when its agreement is
pending before INPI. But it is unlikely that a Brazilian-controlled firm will
get any technology from its supplier until the agreement and payment is approved.
- To strengthen the bargaining position of the national licensee
- To develop knowledge of available technological alternatives
These guidelines are related and are intended to assist the recipient
firm directly. It should be noted that they are of little relevance to foreign-
controlled firms, which this study shows rely mostly on their parents to choose
and supply the technologies they need (see k.^.k to 4.4.6). For Brazilian-
controlled recipient firms, promotional provisions like these (as opposed
to the others which are restrictive in nature) are exactly what seem to be
needed and helpful. The study shows that the internal technical activities,

- 63
the search and selection processes for technology suppliers are indeed weak
and limited for these firms. However, after the regulations have been in force
for four years, only 3 out of 25 Brazilian-controlled firms in the survey reported
ever receiving any assistance from INPI (see '.6.2). Practically none of the
others had anything nice to say about INPI, which they claimed was primarily
obstructionist. This is not surprising as INPI's intervention is mainly at the
registration stage when the two parties have already concluded the agreement,
and not at the pre-regi strat ion stage of search and negotiation. In fact, several
of the Brazilian firms complained bitterly that they had to renegotiate their
contracts because of INPI, thus losing precious lead time and market position.
As a related effort to accomplish this particular objective, there were
talks at INPI in 1975 of setting up a technology databank that would help
recipient firms develop knowledge of available technologies. It remains to be
seen how successfully this will be implemented. Educated opinions seem to
indicate that there are few technology databanks in existence that are useful,
with the Russians operating one that may be an execption.
- To support the technological development of the national enterprise
This is another objective that is promotional in nature. The study offers
some evidence that many Brazilian firms have poor internal technical capacity
(see k.\). However, after four years under the control system, it appeared that
few looked to local sources (whether inhouse or from local research institutes)
for technical assistance (see ^.1.1 and '.'.I). Two other research projects
conducted by MIT's Center for Policy Alternatives on Brazil confirm the general
non-use of local technological facilities ^ , the main reasons being that foreign
technology frequently is proven, cheaper, and readily available whereas the
research performed by local research institutes are not market or user-oriented.
The implementation of this objective would thus put INPI in a rather conflicting
position. If local development of technology is to be encouraged by restricting
Brazilian firms' access to foreign technology, it may put them at a disadvantage
relative to MNC subsidiaries which have their technologies readymade from their
parents. If, however, INPI does not take a restrictive stance, there may not
be a sufficient demand for local technology.
/_ I Stewart Butler, et al: Some Perspectives on Technological Research in Sao
Paulo and Brazi 1 , CPA/wp-75-20, 1975; and Andre Ghirardi, et al: Charac-
teristics of Technological Change in the Sao Paulo Firms , CPA/wp-76-9, 1976.
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- To reduce the costs of the technology to be imported
This study shows that state-controlled enterprises accounted for the lion's
share of technology payments approved by INPI (see table 3.5). It would appear
any serious efforts to reduce the cost of imported technology must include this
group of firms as targets. This raises an important question about the extent
to which INPI can really control the transactions originating from these giant
and powerful enterprises. Ex-military officers appointed by the President often
sit on the board of directors of these enterprises. Indeed, the whole question
of the relationships between various groups of state technocrats in Brazil
(planners, regulators, entrepreneurs, and bankers all played by the state) and
the military in shaping the country's development is one worthy of major research.
The data also raises questions about INPI's effective control over foreign-
controlled recipient firms. The average payment per agreement made by these firms
to their parents for technical assistance are almost twenty times that between
unrelated parties (row 1, columns 1 6 2 of table 3.5). This would seem to
suggest transfer price manipulations. Furthermore, since Brazilian law prohibits
royalty payments for patents and trademarks between subsidiary and parent (see
2.k), this would also seem to suggest that payments are still being made, but
merely through another category of agreements. On the other hand, many foreign
subsidiaries reported receiving technology from their parents without payments
and technology agreements approved by INPI (see ^4.2). This apparent paradox
might be explained by that technology flows from parents to subsidiaries occur
as local market opportunities for their products arise, and that technology
payments, if applied for and approved, are merely one of the many intrafirm
channels of transferring funds (e.g. profit remittances, interest payments,
transfer pricing of Intrafirm of parts, components and finished goods). Thus
foreign subsidiaries can bypass INPI altogether if their parents choose to
obtain remittances through other channels. In fact, intrafirm trade of unfinished
and finished goods in dollar terms are many orders of magnitude of intrafirm
technology payments. Technology payments and agreements submitted to INPI for
approval may only be a standby and substitute channel if needed.
Once again, it seems that a rigorous implementation of this guideline
would be biased against Brazilian-controlled firms, as they have fewer channels
at their disposal to pay their technology suppliers. Furthermore, requiring
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recipient firms to pay less for what they believe the imported technology is
worth may simply reduce the incentive for the supplier to transfer the technology
to these local firms and increase the attractiveness of directly exploiting
the technology by setting up a subsidiary. This would be in direct contradic-
tion with an earlier objective of wanting to encourage technology transfer
through armslength contractual agreements rather than through foreign direct
investment. Many Brazilian executives interviewed asserted they were the better
judge of how much the technology is worth, and that INPI had neither the capa-
city to evaluate the technology nor the market potential. Given Brazil's
relatively open and even encouraging policy towards foreign direct investment
(see 2.1), one important impact of the control system may in fact put private
Brazilian-controlled firms at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the already powerful
state enterprises and MNC subsidiaries.
- To favor non-percentage payments for technical assistance, and when
admitted, limiting the percentages
First it should be pointed out that the payment ceilings expressed as
percentages of sales permitted by INPI are the same as the tax-deduct lb 11 ity
ceilings established by the Ministry of Finance in 1958 and have not been
revised since. Secondly, favoring non-percentage payments may create another
disadvantage for Brazilian-controlled firms. Percentage payments are usually
running payments based on sales, which means that the recipient firm pays
according to the relative success of the technology in producing markets. The
technology supplier presumably would have more incentive to ensure that the
transfer is a success, which is of benefit to the recipient. In contrast, fixed
payments may mean that the recipient firm bears most of the risk rather than
the supplier, as payments would still have to be made regardless of the level
of production and the relative success of the transfer. Thirdly, the data base
of technology agreements reveals that INPI had approved many technical assistance
agreements between foreign subsidiaries and their parent companies with pay-
ments expressed as percentage of sales. Many of these subsidiaries have very
large sales In Brazil, and a partial list from the data base Is presented In
table 5. 1.
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- To maintain the present national interest by not discouraging the
inflow of foreign investment and the real transfer of technology
This last stated objective is somewhat of an enigma. Does it imply that
INPI is acknowledging some basic conflicts In Brazil's policy towards techno-
logy transfer and foreign Investment; some inherent difficulties within the
control system in dealing with the MNC's; a veiled threat of more restrictive
measures towards foreign investment when the present national interest changes;
or perhaps a deference to political realities in which the state has already
accomodated the interests of the powerful MNC presence in Brazil?
These are complex questions with no simple answers. These Issues, and
the exploration of various explanations and implications of the implementation
gap documented in this chapter, will be treated further in the forthcoming
thesis of the author.
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Appendix 2.1
REMITTANCE AND DEDUCTIBILITY LIMITS
FOR TECHNOLOGY PAYMENTS
Group I - Basic Industries
Percentage
Type of Production of Sales
1. Electrical energy
a. Production and Distribution 5%
2. Fuels
a. Petroleum and petroleum by-products S%
3. Transportation
a. Transportation by urban railroad 5%
k. Communications S%
5. Transportation Material
a. Automobiles, trucks and other vehicles S%
b. Automobile parts S%
c. Tires and inner tubes S%
6. Fertilizers 5%
7- Basic chemical products 5%
8. Heavy metal industry
a. Iron and steel 5^
b. Aluminum S%
9. Electrical materials
a. Transformers, dynamos and power generators 5%
b. Electric motors for industry 5%
c. Telephone equipment and apparatus, telegraph and
signal equipment S%
10. Miscellaneous materials
a. Agricultural tractors and combines 5%
b. Equipment, parts and accessories for highway
construction 5%
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Percentage
Type of Production of Sales
c. Equipment, parts and accessories for extractive
and processing industries 5%
II. Naval construction
a. Ships S%
b. Equipment for ships 5%
Group II - Essential Processing Industries
1. Packing materials k%
2. Food products k%
3. Chemicals h%
k. Pharmaceutical products k%
5. Textiles, yarn and fibers k%
6. Shoes and similar products 3-5^
7. Metal products 3-5%
8. Cement and asbestos products 3-5%
S. Electrical material 3%
10. Machinery and equipment
a. Non-superfluous domestic machinery and apparatus 3%
b. Office machinery and equipment 3%
c. Scientific equipment 3%
11. Rubber and plastic articles 2%
12. Articles for hygiene and personal use
a. Shaving articles 2%
b. Dentifrices 2^
c. Soap 2?
13. Other processing industries 1^
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Appendix 3.1
Sources of Information for the Data Base
The Information used in preparing the data base of l^kk3 technology agree-
ments came from the fol lowing source:
Revista da Propriedade Industrial
,
INPI, Rio de Janeiro, Issues
No. ]—2k^, April 1972 to June 1975-
The information used In determining or verifying the sector, country of
origin, relationship between suppliers and receivers, and the ownership of
the receiving firms came from the following sources:
Guia Interinvest
,
Jean Bernet, Editora Interlnvest, Rio de
Janeiro, 1973 and 1975 editions.
Anu^rio das Industrias
,
FIESP, CIESP Sao Paulo, 197'* and 1975
issues.
Banas
—
Classificado Industrial Brasllelro
,
Editora Banas, S§o
Paulo, 1975 and 1976 issues.
Banas Industrial
,
Editora Banas, Sao Paulo, 197'* and 1975
issues.
As Grandes Companhias , Editora Banas, S3o Paulo, 197^~75 and
1975-76 issues.
Quern 6 Quern na Economia Bras
i
lei ra , Visao, Sao Paulo, 197^
and 1975 Issues.
Fortune
,
Time Inc., Chicago, various issues^
Perfil, Visao, Sao Paulo, I97A.



